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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The North Dakota Supreme Court Review summarizes important
decisions rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court. The purpose of the
Review is to indicate cases of first impression, cases of significantly altered
earlier interpretations of North Dakota law, and other cases of interest. As a
special project, Associate Editors assist in researching and writing the
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CIVIL LITIGATION – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Black Gold OilField Services, LLC v. City of Williston
In Black Gold OilField Services, LLC v. City of Williston,1 Black Gold
OilField Services, LLC (“Black Gold”) appealed from an order vacating a
temporary restraining order and denying its request to preliminarily enjoin
1. 2016 ND 30, 875 N.W.2d 515.
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the City of Williston (“Williston”) and the Williston City Commission
(“City Commission”) from enforcing a decision to close Black Gold’s
temporary workforce housing facility during the pendency of Black Gold’s
lawsuit against Williston and the City Commission.2
Black Gold owned the Black Gold Williston Lodge, a temporary
workforce housing facility commonly known as a man camp.3 The man
camp housed Bakken oilfield workers and was located outside Williston
city limits.4 The man camp began operating in March 2011, under a
temporary use permit issued by Williams County.5 In February 2013,
Williston annexed about 4888 acres of land in Williams County, including
the land of the man camps.6 In September 2013, Williston adopted a
resolution to extend permits issued by Williams County for workforce
housing facilities, including the man cap in issue; however, the facilities
had to comply with Williston’s zoning, building, and fire codes.7
Black Gold received notification in December 2013 that it must install
a fire protection sprinkler system.8 Although Black Gold requested a 180day extension, Williston granted Black Gold a one-year extension.9 In June
2014, Willison again notified Black Gold that the man camp must install the
sprinkler system by December 2014.10 In November 2014, Black Gold was
in contact with the Williston Fire Department regarding the installation of
the sprinkler system.11 The fire inspector informed Black Gold that the
installation of the sprinklers would be finished in February 2015.12
In January 2015, a meeting was held in which the City Commission
considered issues about the fire sprinkler systems at these workforce
housing facilities.13 The meeting minutes stated that Black Gold did not
comply with the City Codes, that Black Gold was given adequate time to
comply with the codes, and that Black Gold failed to meet the rules and
regulations.14 The City Commission held a subsequent meeting in February

2. Black Gold OilField Services, LLC, ¶ 1, 875 N.W.2d at 517.
3. Id. ¶ 2.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Black Gold OilField Services, LLC, ¶ 4, 875 N.W.2d at 518.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. ¶ 5.
14. Black Gold OilField Services, LLC, ¶ 5, 875 N.W.2d at 518-19.
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2015,15 and by this time, the sprinkler system was installed and the facility
passed the fire inspection.16 Ultimately, however, Williston informed Black
Gold that all tenants were required to vacate the facility by May 1, 2015,
and that the structure must be removed by September 2, 2015.17
Subsequently, Black Gold filed a complaint against Williston and the
City Commission for a declaratory judgment and to prohibit enforcement of
the decision.18 Black Gold’s allegations were as follows:
Commissioner Cymbaluk was a real estate agent and property
manager in Williston and had a financial interest in closing Black
Gold’s housing facility. Black Gold alleged that Williston’s
decision violated Black Gold’s state and federal constitutional
rights to due process because the decision was arbitrary,
capricious, and unreasonable; that Black Gold had insufficient
time and opportunity to comply with fire and building codes after
the annexation; that Black Gold was not provided notice and an
opportunity to appear at the January 13, 2015 City Commission
meeting; and that there was no basis for the decision not to extend
the special use permit after the sprinklers were installed. Black
Gold also alleged the City Commission lacked jurisdiction because
the Williston building officer has exclusive jurisdiction under
Williston’s zoning ordinances to enforce Williston’s building and
fire codes after appropriate notice and opportunity to correct
violations.19
Black Gold’s complaint sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and
a writ of prohibition to prevent Williston from implementing its decision.20
Additionally, Black Gold immediately sought a temporary restraining order
to prevent Williston from closing the man camp pending the lawsuit.21 The
district court initially granted the temporary restraining order; however,
after Williston responded, the court vacated the temporary restraining order
and denied Black Gold’s request for preliminary injunction of Williston’s
decision.22 The district court found that Black Gold received adequate time
to comply with Williston’s requirements, that Black Gold was afforded the

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. ¶ 6, 875 N.W.2d at 519.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 7.
Id. at 519-20.
Black Gold OilField Services, LLC, ¶ 17, 875 N.W.2d at 523.
Id. ¶ 8, 875 N.W.2d at 520.
Id.
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opportunity to present its arguments as to why it failed to comply, and that
Williston acted within its authority.23 Black Gold appealed.24
The North Dakota Supreme Court initially considered the district
court’s order denying Black Gold’s request for preliminary injunction.25
Section 28-27-02 of the North Dakota Century Code provides the statutory
criteria for appealability.26 The order must have met one of the statutory
criteria to prevent dismissal.27 If the order was appealable, it must have
also complied with Rule 54(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil
Procedure.28 An order vacating or dissolving a temporary restraining order
after notice and a hearing is an appealable order under §§ 28–27–02(3) and
(7).29 In this case, however, there was no Rule 54(b) order.30 The Court
stated that “[a]lthough we cannot consider this matter as an appeal because
there is no Rule 54(b) certification, we conclude the issues in this case
about Black Gold’s request for interim relief affect fundamental interests of
the litigants.”31 The Court considered Black Gold’s appeal as a request to
exercise its supervisory jurisdiction and considered the issues raised by
Black Gold on the merits.32
A district court’s discretion to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is
based on the following factors: (1) substantial probability of succeeding on
the merits; (2) irreparable injury; (3) harm to other interested parties; and
(4) effect on public interest.33 Additionally, the Court stated “[a district
court’s] determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion.”34 A district court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unconscionable manner.35 Black Gold provided three
arguments as to why it had a substantial probability of succeeding on the
merits.
First, Black Gold argued that it would succeed on the merits because
Williston’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.36 Black
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. ¶ 9.
26. Black Gold OilField Services, LLC, ¶ 9, 875 N.W.2d at 520 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §
28-27-02 (2016)).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. ¶ 10, 875 N.W.2d at 521.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Black Gold OilField Services, LLC, ¶ 12, 875 N.W.2d at 521.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. ¶ 13.
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Gold claimed that Williston had no rational reason to order the closure of
the man camp because it had been in compliance since February 2015.37
The Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion because
Black Gold’s argument did not challenge the validity of the enactment of
any zoning ordinance, Williston had authority to consider the extension of
the special use permit, Black Gold admitted it failed to perform an act the
law required, and more importantly, it failed to demonstrate how an appeal
to the district court was not an adequate legal remedy to resolve this
claim.38 Black Gold’s second argument was that it had a substantial
probability of succeeding on the merits because Williston’s decision
violated Black Gold’s due process rights.39 It argued a due process
violation on grounds that Commissioner Cymbaluk’s (“Cymbaluk”)
participation in the decision established bias which resulted in an unfair
decision.40
The court looked to § 44-04-22, which provided a statutory standard
for assessing potential disqualifications of city commissioners.41 The
commissioner’s conduct must have been a direct and substantial personal or
pecuniary interest.42 In support of the motion to vacate the temporary
restraining order, Williston submitted an affidavit of Cymbaluk,43 the
relevant parts of which stated:
14. On January 13, 2015, the City Commission took action on
Black Gold and ATCO workforce housing facilities extension of
their temporary permit.
15. The City Commission unanimously voted to NOT extend their
permit due to their failures to comply with the requirements laid
by the City and Resolution # 13–127, in particular their failure to
install a fire sprinkler system on or before December 31, 2014.
16. On January 15, 2015, two days after the City Commission
took action on Black Gold’s temporary housing permit extension, I
was contacted by Chris, a representative of Calfrac Well Services,
Corp., regarding the action the City took on January 13, 2015.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Black Gold OilField Services, LLC, ¶ 17, 875 N.W.2d at 523.
Id. ¶ 18.
Id.
Id. ¶ 20 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-22 (2016)).
Id. ¶ 21, 875 N.W.2d at 524.
Id. ¶ 23.
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17. I was originally not available when the representative
contacted me by phone, so I returned the phone call shortly after
he left a message requesting I return his call.
18. When I spoke with Calfrac’s representative I relayed only the
information that [was] already available to the public regarding the
City Commission’s decision not to extend Black Gold’s temporary
housing permit. This information was not only public, as the
January 13, 2015, City Commission meeting was open to the
public, but the Williston Herald also published an article on the
City Commission’s action regarding Black Gold’s facility on
January 14, 2015.
19. Further, Black Gold has attempted to assert I have a financial
incentive to contact Black Gold’s customers since I am a licensed
real estate broker in Williston, North Dakota, as tenants of Black
Gold would move into apartments or homes managed by Basin
Brokers.
20. I have no interest, individually or otherwise, in any residential
apartments.
21. As a shareholder of Basin Brokers, Inc., Basin Brokers does
not and has not managed any residential apartments, or otherwise.
22.
The only residential management Basin Brokers has
undertaken and is undertaking is a single family condominium . . .
and the reason why Basin Brokers agreed to undertake the
management of this property is a real estate agent for Basin
Brokers listed the property and it failed to sell by the fall of 2013.
The owner of the property asked if Basin Brokers could lease it on
her behalf as she did not want it to lie vacant during the winter and
Basin Brokers agreed to do so. The term of the lease is for
November 1, 2013 until May 30, 2015.44
Black Gold argued that Cymbaluk had a direct financial incentive to
close the man camp.45 The Court found that these were conclusory
assertions and that Black Gold did not offer evidence to rebut Cymbaluk or
prove that Cymbaluk had any direct and substantial pecuniary or financial
interest in closing the man camps.46 The Court also concluded that the

44. Black Gold OilField Services, LLC, ¶ 23, 875 N.W.2d at 525-26.
45. Id. ¶ 24, 875 N.W.2d at 526.
46. Id.
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district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a preliminary injunction
on this issue.47
Finally, Black Gold argued that it had a substantial probability of
succeeding on the merits because Williston’s decision violated zoning
ordinances.48 Black Gold claimed that Williston acted beyond its authority
because only the building office was authorized to enforce zoning
ordinances.49 The Court reasoned that Black Gold’s argument was rejected
because Williston’s actions were not enforcing an existing zoning
ordinance; instead, Williston’s actions constituted a vote not to take further
action to extend Black Gold’s permit.50 The district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying a preliminary injunction on this issue.51 Hence, the
Court held that Black Gold failed to establish a substantial probability of
succeeding on the merits of its lawsuit against Williston and the City
Commission. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion, and
the request for a supervisory writ was denied.52

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 25.
Black Gold OilField Services, LLC, ¶ 26, 875 N.W.2d at 526.
Id.
Id. ¶ 27.

274

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 92: 267

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL
City of Grand Forks v. Gale
In City of Grand Forks v. Gale,53 Jason Gale (“Gale”) appealed from a
criminal judgment in which a jury found him guilty of driving under the
influence.54 Gale argued that he was convicted and sentenced in violation
of his state and federal constitutional rights to a speedy trial.55 The North
Dakota Supreme Court reversed the criminal judgment, finding that Gale’s
right to a speedy trial was violated.56
Gale was cited for driving under the influence on April 20, 1995.57 His
attorney, Henry Rowe, requested that Gale sign a “limited power of
attorney.”58 The power of attorney authorized Howe to appear in court on
Gale’s behalf.59 A sentencing hearing was scheduled for June 21, 1995.60
The court mailed three notices of hearing requiring Gale to appear
personally.61 Gale failed to appear at the sentencing hearing. As a result, an
arrest warrant was issued.62 No subsequent action was taken until March 5,
2015, when Gale filed a motion to recall the arrest warrant.63
Consequently, the City of Grand Forks (“the City”) filed an amended
information.64 Gale filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that the City
violated Gale’s right to a speedy trial.65 Gale argued that he was unaware
of the pending case, that he was unaware of the active warrant, that his
attorney told him the case was closed, and that all fines had been paid.66
Gale asserted that the City did not prosecute his case for twenty years
despite the fact that during that time, he had been in and out of court for
unrelated legal matters.67

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

2016 ND 58, 876 N.W.2d 701.
Id. ¶ 1, 876 N.W.2d at 704.
Id. ¶ 4, 876 N.W.2d at 705.
Id. ¶ 23, 876 N.W.2d at 710.
Id. ¶ 2, 876 N.W.2d at 704.
Id.
Gale, ¶ 2, 876 N.W.2d at 704.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Gale, ¶ 3, 876 N.W.2d at 704.
Id.
Id.
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A jury trial was held on July 7, 2015.68 The arresting officer was the
only witness to testify.69 Due to the twenty-year delay, most of the officer’s
testimony was based on the report he had written after the arrest.70
Furthermore, no blood-alcohol test evidence was admitted and Gale was
found guilty.71
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1,
Section 12 of the North Dakota Constitution guarantee criminal defendants
the right to a speedy trial.72 The United States Supreme Court developed a
four-factor test to determine whether the right to a speedy trial has been
violated: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the
accused’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the
accused.73
The North Dakota Supreme Court first looked at the length of the
delay, which must be long enough to be presumptively prejudicial.74 Here,
the length of the delay was twenty years, which is clearly longer than the
time required to try a DUI case.75 The prosecution even conceded to this
factor,76 which resulted in this factor heavily weighing in favor of Gales.77
The North Dakota Supreme Court next looked to second factor, which
is the reason for the delay. “A defendant has no duty to bring himself to
trial; the state has that duty. . . . However, if the defendant causes the delay,
this factor weighs against him.”78 The City argued that Gale caused the
delay because he received three notices which made him aware of the
sentencing hearing.79 Gale asserted that he was unaware that he had to
appear, as he signed a power of attorney authorizing his attorney to appear
in court on his behalf.80 Further, Gale claimed that his attorney told him the
case was closed.81 The North Dakota Supreme Court found that this factor
weighed in favor of Gale because the City ceased prosecution after Gale
failed to appear.82 “The prosecutor and the court have an affirmative
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
Id. at 705.
Gale, ¶ 4, 876 N.W.2d at 705.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
Gale, ¶ 5, 876 N.W.2d at 705 (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972)).
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 10, 876 N.W.2d at 706.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 11.
Gale, ¶ 12, 876 N.W.2d at 706.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 16, 876 N.W.2d at 708.
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constitutional obligation to try the defendant in a timely manner, and this
duty requires a good faith, diligent effort to bring him to trial quickly. . . .
This factor ‘weighs against the State if the State is negligent by not
diligently pursuing prosecution.’”83
The third factor the North Dakota Supreme Court looked at was
whether the accused asserted his right to a speedy trial. A defendant’s
knowledge of a pending case is important.84 The Court reasoned that
because Gale was aware of the pending case, but did not assert his right to a
speedy trial until twenty years later, this factor favored the City.85 Finally,
the North Dakota Supreme Court considered the last factor, which was
prejudice to the defendant. The United States Supreme Court has instructed
courts to asses this factor in light of the following elements, which highlight
what the right to a speedy trial was meant to do: (1) prevent oppressive
pretrial incarceration; (2) minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and
(3) limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.86 The first
element, prevention of oppressive pretrial incarceration, was not applicable
in this case, as Gale was not incarcerated prior to trial.87 The second factor,
minimization of the accused’s anxiety and concern, was also insignificant
because Gale asserted that he was unaware of the pending case while it was
delayed.88 Gale did not claim he experienced any anxiety or concern until
the charge was brought to light twenty years later.89
The last factor, impairment of the accused’s defense, was relevant
because Gale claimed his defense was significantly impaired.90 He asserted
that his efforts to cross-examine the arresting officer, who was the only
witness at trial, were hampered because the officer did not remember
anything about the incident that was not included in the arrest report, which
was prepared for the purpose of prosecuting Gale.91 Gale stated “[t]here
can be no effective cross-examination of a witness who remembers little to
nothing outside his report.”92 The City also argued that its case was
prejudiced: it was unable to utilize blood-test results because of foundation
issues, and thus, “was left to prosecute a case based on an officer who had

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. (quoting State v. Moran, 2006 ND 62, ¶ 10, 711 N.W.2d 915).
Id. ¶ 17.
Gale, ¶ 17, 876 N.W.2d at 708.
Id. ¶ 18, 876 N.W.2d at 708-09.
Id. at 709.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 19.
Gale, ¶ 19, 876 N.W.2d at 709.
Id.
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very little specific recollection of the event and was relying primarily on a
report he had prepared twenty years earlier.”93 The City maintained that it
was not negligent in its prosecution, and it argued that Gale was required to
show actual prejudice—something it asserted Gale had not done.94 The
Court found that the City failed to diligently pursue the case; therefore, the
prosecution was negligent.95 The Court also concluded that Gale was
entitled to a presumption of prejudice.96 Three of the four factors weighed
in Gale’s favor. As a result, Gale’s right to a speedy trial was violated.97

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 21, 876 N.W.2d at 709-10.
Id. ¶ 22, 876 N.W.2d at 710.
Gale, ¶ 23, 876 N.W.2d at 710.
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CONVERSION AND FRAUDULENT TRANSFER—REMEDIES—
AMOUNT OF DAMAGES
PHI Financial Services, Inc. v. Johnston Law Office, P.C.
PHI Financial Services, Inc. v. Johnston Law Office, P.C., involved a
secured creditor bringing action against a debtor’s law firm seeking to
recover funds under theories of conversion and fraudulent transfer.98 The
district court entered judgment in favor of the creditor, PHI Financial
Services, Inc. (“PHI”).99 Johnston Law Office, P.C. (“Johnston”) appealed,
and the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded, holding that (1) the firm was not liable for allegedly fraudulent
transfer of funds to debtor’s father; (2) the firm was entitled only to funds
representing services performed for debtor; (3) creditor perfected its
security interests in governmental agricultural payments; and (4) the firm
was subject to prejudgment interest on wrongly-retained attorney fees on
date that funds were placed in office business account.100
In 2007, Thomas and Mari Grabanski and John and Dawn Keely
formed the Grabanski Land Partnership (“GLP”) for the purpose of
purchasing farmland in Texas.101 They later formed G & K Farms (“G &
K”), a North Dakota general partnership, also for the purpose of purchasing
Texas farmland.102 G & K was insured under the Supplemental Revenue
Assistance Payments Program (“SURE”), which was administered by the
United States Department of Agriculture.103 In 2007 and 2008, Choice
Financial Group (“Choice”) made a series of loans to G & K, totaling more
than $6.75 million.104 In the security agreements between G & K and
Choice, G & K agreed to, among other things, grant Choice a security
interest in government and insurance payments.105 In 2008, PHI loaned
$6.6 million to G & K, and, in return, G & K granted security agreements to
PHI, which included “. . .all state or federal farm program payments. . . .”106
G & K suffered $2.5 million in losses during 2008, but continued to
plant crops in 2009; therefore, the Keeley’s withdrew from G & K early

98. 2016 ND 20, 874 N.W.2d 910.
99. Id. ¶ 6, 874 N.W.2d at 914.
100. Id. ¶ 1, 874 N.W.2d. at 912.
101. Id. ¶ 2.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. PHI Financial Services, Inc., ¶ 3, 874 N.W.2d at 912.
105. Id. at 913.
106. Id. ¶ 4.
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that year.107 The Grabanskis then formed Texas Family Farms (“TXX”) to
farm the property.108 The Grabanskis eventually defaulted on all loans
provided to their farming business entities and retained representation from
Johnston.109 Numerous lawsuits were filed against the Grabanskis and their
various business entities, and in March 2011, PHI obtained a judgment of
$7.5 million against the Grabanskis and G & K.110
In October 2011, G & K received Supplemental Revenue Assistance
Payments Program (“SURE”) payments of $328,168 from the federal
government.111 Johnston advised the Grabanskis not to deposit the SURE
payments into G & K’s North Dakota bank account to shield the deposit
from the amounts owed to Choice or other potential North Dakota
creditors.112 As such, the Grabanskis deposited the SURE amounts into a
new bank account in Texas.113 The Grabanskis then transferred $170,400
of the SURE payment from the Texas bank account to Johnston’s trust
account through two transactions, for the purposes of paying attorney’s fees
and to send money to Tom Grabanski’s father, to indemnify him for monies
paid on behalf of G & K the previous year.114
PHI brought action against Johnston, later adding Choice, seeking to
recover $170,400 on theories of conversion and fraudulent transfer.115 The
district court held that PHI’s security interest in the SURE payments held
priority over Choice’s interest, and PHI was entitled to any money sent to
Grabanski’s father from the SURE payments.116 The district court also
found the Grabanski’s payment of $150,000 to Johnston for legal services
was fraudulent, but allowed Johnston to retain reasonably equivalent value
for services rendered of $35,000.117 A judgment awarding $167,203.24
plus interest was entered in favor of PHI.118
Questions regarding actual or constructive fraudulent transfer are
questions of fact, subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.119

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
24, 31.

Id. ¶ 5.
Id.
Id.
PHI Financial Services, Inc., ¶ 5, 874 N.W.2d at 913.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 914.
Id. ¶ 6.
PHI Financial Services, Inc., ¶ 6, 874 N.W.2d at 914.
Id.
Id.
Farstveet v. Rudolph ex rel. Eileen Rudolph Estate, 2000 ND 189, ¶ 20, 630 N.W.2d
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Johnston argued the district court erred in voiding the $24,225.37 it
transferred from its law office trust to Grabanski’s father.120 The North
Dakota Supreme Court found that Johnston held the $24,225.37 for the sole
purpose of fulfilling an instruction to make the funds available to someone
else.121 The Court further found that district court erred as a matter of law
in holding Johnston liable for the transfer of $24,225.37 to Grabanski’s
father.122
Johnston further argued the district court erred in voiding a “major
portion” of the $145,774.63 payment for attorney fees and legal services
after finding Johnston was a good-faith transferee which had provided
reasonably equivalent value for the transfer under North Dakota Century
Code § 13-02.1-08(1).123 The Supreme Court agreed the $35,000 the
district court granted to Johnston constituted the reasonable value of work
Johnston provided the Grabanskis.124
In its cross-appeal, PHI argued the district court erred in finding
Johnston provided any value to G & K because G & K was defunct before
legal representation occurred.125 Whether reasonably equivalent value has
been received in exchange for a transfer is a question of fact subject to the
clearly erroneous standard of review.126 The Court found PHI did not
provide evidence to establish that $35,000 was an unreasonable amount of
attorney fees for Johnston’s work on behalf of Grabanski.127
Johnston next argued that the district court erred in holding PHI was
not barred by res judicata128 from pursuing Uniform Commercial Code
Article 9 remedies to collect the funds after it had obtained a money
judgment against the Grabanskis and G & K in federal court.129 The North
Dakota Supreme Court disagreed with Johnston for two reasons. The first
reason was that a creditor may obtain a money judgment on the debt owed
and foreclose on collateral in one or more proceedings so long as there is no

120. PHI Financial Services, Inc., ¶ 11, 874 N.W.2d. at 915.
121. Id. ¶ 17, 874 N.W.2d at 917.
122. Id.
123. N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-02.1-08(1) (2016) (“A transfer or obligation is not voidable
under subdivision a of subsection 1 of section 13-02.1-04 against a person that took in good faith
and for a reasonably equivalent value given the debtor or against any subsequent transferee or
obligee”).
124. Id. ¶ 22, 874 N.W.2d at 918.
125. Id. ¶ 21.
126. See Four Season’s Healthcare Ctr., Inc. v. Linderkamp, 2013 ND 159, ¶ 20, 837
N.W.2d 147.
127. PHI Financial Services, Inc., ¶ 22, 874 N.W.2d. at 918.
128. Res Judicata, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“An issue that has been
definitively settled by judicial decision”).
129. PHI Financial Services, ¶ 24, 874 N.W.2d. at 917.
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double recovery.130 The second reason was that Johnston failed to
acknowledge that the SURE payment was received by G & K after
judgment was entered in the federal court action, and that the causes of
action were not split.131
The North Dakota Supreme Court further concluded Johnston was
incorrect in arguing that PHI failed to perfect its security interest in the
SURE payments transferred to the law firm.132 The Court reasoned that
Johnston’s argument that the crops or their proceeds needed to be properly
perfected was incorrect; rather, the government payments should have been
properly perfected, as they were.133
Johnston next argued that the district court erred in calculating
prejudgment interest beginning on the dates G & K transferred the funds to
the law firm rather than the date PHI filed its complaint to the North Dakota
Supreme Court.134 The Court ruled that the district court erred in awarding
prejudgment interest from the dates the SURE funds were transferred from
G & K to Johnston, and held that Johnston could only be liable for
prejudgment interest from the date the funds, designated as attorney fees,
were removed from the Johnston law office trust account and placed in the
office business account.135
Choice then argued the district court erred in ruling PHI’s security
interest had priority over Choice’s security interest,136 because PHI did not
perfect its security interest by filing a financing statement in the state of
Texas listing its interest in the crops as “farm products.”137 The North
Dakota Supreme Court found that the crops themselves, or their proceeds,
were not the collateral at issue, and that the governmental SURE payments
did not qualify as “farm products,” but rather as “contract rights, accounts
or general intangibles.”138 Because PHI had filed its financing statement
covering the SURE payments in North Dakota before Choice, the Court
held PHI’s security interest had priority over Choice’s security interest, and
the district court did not err in its ruling.139

130. See Prod. Credit Ass’n of Mandan v. Obrigewitch, 443 N.W.2d 923, 926 (N.D. 1989);
see also N. D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-98(3) (2016) which states “[t]he rights under subsections 1
and 2 are cumulative and may be exercised simultaneously.”
131. PHI Financial Services, Inc., ¶ 26, 874 N.W.2d. at 919.
132. See id. ¶¶ 27-30, 874 N.W.2d. at 919-20.
133. Id. ¶ 30, 874 N.W.2d. at 920.
134. Id. ¶ 31.
135. Id. ¶ 33, 874 N.W.2d. at 920-21.
136. Id. ¶ 35, 874 N.W.2d at 921.
137. PHI Financial Services, Inc., ¶ 36, 874 N.W.2d. at 921.
138. Id. ¶¶ 36-37.
139. Id. ¶¶ 40-41, 874 N.W.2d at 922.
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Justice Sandstrom dissented from the majority.140 He disagreed with
the portion of the majority that exonerated Johnston for its role in the
fraudulent transfer of $20,400 from G & K to Grabanski’s father.141 Justice
Sandstrom noted that because Johnston placed the money in its trust
account before transferring it to Grabanski’s father, the transaction
constituted the type of fraudulent transfer that “is precisely the sort of
insider transaction the statute142 is intended to prevent.”143

140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. ¶ 45, 874 N.W.2d at 922-23 (Sandstrom, J. dissenting).
Id.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-02.1-08 (2016).
PHI Financial Services, Inc., ¶ 45, 874 N.W.2d at 923.
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CRIMINAL LAW – CIVIL COMMITMENTS – SEXUALLY
DANGEROUS INDIVIDUALS
County State’s Attorney v. Johnson (In re Johnson)
In County State’s Attorney v. Johnson,144 Jeremy Johnson (“Johnson”)
appealed a district court order continuing his commitment as a sexually
dangerous individual.145 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the
district court’s order after concluding that the district court’s findings were
insufficient.146
In 2012, the state committed Johnson to the state hospital as a sexually
dangerous individual.147 The North Dakota Supreme Court upheld
Johnson’s initial commitment in Interest of Johnson.148 When Johnson
petitioned the district court for discharge, it continued his commitment,
finding that he was a sexually dangerous individual.149 Johnson appealed
and, upon hearing his case, the North Dakota Supreme Court remanded his
case for further fact findings regarding whether he had serious difficulty
controlling his behavior.150 On remand, the district court reviewed the
record, made additional findings, and continued Johnson’s commitment.151
Johnson filed a timely appeal.152
The standard of review for civil commitment of sexually dangerous
individuals, set forth in Johnson, required the North Dakota Supreme Court
to affirm the district court’s order denying a discharge petition unless it was
“induced by an erroneous view of the law” or the Court “is firmly
convinced it is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.”153 The
Court also explained that it gave “great deference to the trial court’s
credibility determinations of expert witnesses” because the trial court was
“the best credibility evaluator in cases of conflicting testimony. . . . “154
To prove a committed individual remains a sexually dangerous
individual, the state bears the burden to prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, the three following statutory elements:
144. 2016 ND 29, 876 N.W.2d 25.
145. Id. ¶ 1, 876 N.W.2d at 26.
146. Id.
147. Id. ¶ 2.
148. Id.; 2013 ND 146, 835 N.W.2d 806.
149. In re Johnson, 2016 ND 29, ¶ 2, 876 N.W.2d at 26.
150. Id.; 2015 ND 71, 861 N.W.2d 484.
151. In re Johnson, 2015 ND 71, ¶ 9, 861 N.W.2d 484, 487.
152. In re Johnson, 2016 ND 29, ¶ 2, 876 N.W.2d at 26.
153. In re Johnson, 2015 ND 71, ¶¶ 4-5, 861 N.W.2d 484, 486 (quoting Matter of Wolff,
2011 ND 76, ¶ 5, 796 N.W.2d 644, 646).
154. In re Johnson, 2016 ND 29, ¶ 3, 876 N.W.2d at 27.

284

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 92: 267

(1) the individual has engaged in sexually predatory conduct, (2)
the individual has a congenital or acquired condition that is
manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other
mental disorder or dysfunction, and (3) the individual’s condition
makes them likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory
conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or mental health
or safety of others.155
Additionally, in order to satisfy substantive due process, the state must
prove that “the committed individual has serious difficulty controlling his
behavior.”156
According to the Court, as a matter of law, the district court errs when
its findings are insufficient or do not support its legal conclusions.157 The
North Dakota Supreme Court deferred to a district court’s determination
that an individual has serious difficulty controlling behavior when it is
supported by specific findings demonstrating that difficulty.158
The Court listed several of its previous findings, which constituted
serious difficulty controlling behavior, such as when an individual: (1)
frequently assaulted staff and his peers,159 (2) yelled profanities, (3) had an
explosive temper, (4) refused to attend treatment, (5) acted in a sexual
manner with a peer,160 (6) engaged in a sexual relationship with a peer, (7)
stated he would take advantage of a minor if he knew he would not get
caught, (8) would use drugs if they were offered to him, or (9) would
provide oral sex if someone came to his door and wanted it.161
The Court clarified that it will find error if the district court cannot
support its determination that an individual had difficulty controlling his
behavior with specific factual findings.162 As support, the Court cited

155. Id. (quoting In re Johnson, 2015 ND 71, ¶ 5, 861 N.W.2d 484, 486).
156. Id. (citing Matter of Wolff, 2011 ND 76, ¶ 7, 796 N.W.2d 644, 647). The Court
continues:
We construe the definition of a sexually dangerous individual to mean that proof of a
nexus between the requisite disorder and dangerousness encompasses proof that the
disorder involves serious difficulty in controlling behavior and suffices to distinguish a
dangerous sexual offender whose disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the
dangerous but typical recidivist in the ordinary criminal case.
See also Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
157. In re Johnson, 2016 ND 29, ¶ 4, 876 N.W.2d at 27 (citing In re R.A.S., 2008 ND 185, ¶
8, 756 N.W.2d 771, 773).
158. Id. ¶ 5, 876 N.W.2d at 28.
159. Id. (citing In re G.L.D., 2011 ND 52, ¶ 7, 795 N.W.2d 346, 349-50).
160. Id. (citing Wolff ¶ 9, 796 N.W.2d 648).
161. Id. (citing In re M.D., 2012 ND 261, ¶ 10, 825 N.W.2d 838, 842).
162. Id. ¶ 6.
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Midgett163 and Johnson’s 2015 appeal.164 In 2015, the Court found error
when the district court “merely analyzed Johnson’s criminal history but ‘did
not specifically state the facts upon which it relied, nor did it make specific
findings on whether Johnson has serious difficulty in controlling his
behavior.’”165
Johnson asserted that the district court erred when it failed, yet again,
to make sufficient findings that he had serious difficulty controlling his
behavior.166 The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with Johnson.167
The State insisted the district court’s finding that Johnson’s inadequate
progression in treatment was sufficient to show Johnson had serious
difficulty controlling his behavior.168 While the North Dakota Supreme
Court agreed that subpar progress in treatment “may indicate serious
difficulty controlling behavior,” it “decline[d] to infer that one equals the
other.”169
The Court reasoned that “lack of progress in treatment alone is
insufficient to meet this requirement for commitment.”170 The Court
decided that the State had not met its statutory or constitutional burden
because “the district court made no findings relating to Johnson’s present
inability to control his behavior.”171 As a result, the North Dakota Supreme
Court found an error of law because, on remand for the specific purpose,
the district court still did not find Johnson had serious difficulty controlling
his behavior, yet it continued his commitment.172 Therefore, the Court
reversed the district court’s order and directed Johnson be released from
civil commitment.173
Justice Dale V. Sandstrom dissented because “[he] would have
affirmed on the last appeal” and would again “affirm here.”174

163. In re Johnson, 2016 ND 29, ¶ 6, 876 N.W.2d at 28 (citing In re Midgett, 2009 ND 106,
¶ 9, 766 N.W.2d 717, 720: “[t]he district court did not specifically state the facts upon which it
relied or even make a finding on whether Midgett had serious difficulty in controlling his
behavior.”).
164. In re Johnson, 2015 ND 71, ¶ 9, 861 N.W.2d 484, 487.
165. In re Johnson, 2016 ND 29, ¶ 6, 876 N.W.2d at 28 (quoting In re Johnson, 2015 ND
71, 861 N.W.2d 484).
166. Id. ¶ 7.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. ¶ 8, 876 N.W.2d at 28 (emphasis in original).
171. In re Johnson, 2016 ND 29, ¶ 11, 876 N.W.2d at 29 (emphasis in original).
172. Id.
173. Id. ¶ 12.
174. Id. ¶¶ 14-15.
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CRIMINAL LAW—CONSITUTIONAL LAW—SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES
State v. Ballard
In State v. Ballard,175 defendant Jeremy Ballard (“Ballard”) entered a
conditional guilty plea in district court for possession of methamphetamine
and possession of drug paraphernalia, following denial of his motion to
suppress evidence and to dismiss the charges against him.176 Ballard
argued the district court should have suppressed the evidence against him
because it resulted from a probationary search of his home without
suspicion and in violation of his constitutional rights.177 In a divided
opinion, the North Dakota Supreme Court held the suspicionless search of
an unsupervised probationer’s home was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.178
In October 2013, Ballard pleaded guilty to several misdemeanor drug
crimes, and among other minor punishments, was sentenced to two years of
unsupervised probation.179 Relevant conditions of Ballard’s probation
included that he “submit to a search of his person, place and vehicle at the
request of law enforcement without a warrant” and that he “submit to
random drug-testing without a warrant or probable cause, including but not
limited to, urine analysis.”180 In March 2014, a Divide County deputy
sheriff saw Ballard driving a car with two passengers.181 The deputy was
aware Ballard and one of his passengers were on unsupervised probation
and were subject to searches and random drug tests, and stopped Ballard’s
car.182 The deputy testified that he stopped Ballard for the sole reason of
performing a probation search and that he did not have any “reasonable
articulabl[e] suspicion” of any drug-related or criminal activity when he
made the stop.183 When the deputy activated his emergency lights, Ballard
pulled over in front of his residence, and the deputy asked Ballard to exit
the vehicle so he could perform a pat-down and search of Ballard’s
vehicle.184 Ballard agreed; yet, neither yielded contraband.185

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

2016 ND 8, 874 N.W.2d 61.
Ballard, ¶¶ 1, 4, 874 N.W.2d at 62.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Ballard, ¶ 3, 874 N.W.2d at 62.
Id.
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 63.
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The deputy then entered Ballard’s residence without consent or a
warrant.186
The deputy searched Ballard’s bedroom and found
methamphetamine paraphernalia and a bag of crystal methamphetamine.187
He then arrested Ballard, who was charged with possession of
methamphetamine and possession of paraphernalia, both class C felonies.188
At his hearing, Ballard’s motion to suppress the evidence found in his
bedroom was denied, and he entered a conditional guilty plea reserving the
right to appeal the denial to suppress the evidence.189
Questions of law are fully reviewable.190 “Whether a violation of the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures has
occurred is a question of law.”191 When reviewing the constitutionality of
probationary searches, the North Dakota Constitution provides the same
protections as the United States Constitution:192 the unsupervised
probationer’s liberty interests and expectation of privacy must be weighed
against the state’s interest in protecting its citizens.193
Prior to its analysis of the case, the North Dakota Supreme Court
outlined the case law history regarding the legality of suspicionless,
warrantless searches of probationers, which has recently and significantly
developed in both North Dakota and the United States. In 1972, in State v.
Schlosser,194 the North Dakota Supreme Court held that evidence obtained
during a warrantless probationary search of a supervised probationer was
allowable.195 The probationer’s terms were similar to Ballard’s in that he
agreed to be searched without a warrant.196 The Court reasoned the
defendant’s status as a probationer affected his rights under the Fourth
Amendment such that he had a lesser expectation of liberty and privacy
than a non-criminal citizen, and the state had an interest in facilitating his
rehabilitation and guarding the public.197 The Schlosser Court further
weighed the reasonableness of the search in question with the criminality of

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
Ballard, ¶ 4, 874 N.W.2d at 63.
Id.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 6 (citing State v. Adams, 2010 ND 184, ¶ 7, 788 N.W.2d 619, 622).
Id. at 63-64 (citing State v. Maurstad, 2002 ND 121, ¶ 11, 647 N.W.2d 688, 691).
Id. ¶ 8, 874 N.W.2d at 64.
Ballard, ¶ 9, 874 N.W.2d at 64.
202 N.W.2d 136 (N.D. 1972).
Ballard, ¶ 11, 874 N.W.2d at 64.
Id.
Id. at 65.
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the defendant’s conduct.198 Then, in State v. Perbix,199 the North Dakota
Supreme Court expanded its decision in Schlosser by holding warrantless
probation searches were valid under the Fourth Amendment if the searches:
(1) contributed to rehabilitation; (2) were not used as subterfuge for
criminal investigations; and (3) were performed in a reasonable manner.200
In 2001, in United States v. Knights,201 the United States Supreme
Court held a deputy’s warrantless search of a probationer’s home was
constitutional when based on reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity.202
Shortly after, in State v. Maurstad,203 the North Dakota Supreme Court
stated it would no longer analyze the alleged purpose of a probationary
search to determine its validity, nor would it consider whether the search
was conducted as a subterfuge for a criminal investigation; rather the Court
would view the totality of the circumstances surrounding the search.204
Then, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Samson v.
California205 expanded on the idea that there exists a spectrum of
expectation of liberty and privacy regarding warrantless searches, such that
probationers expect more privacy than parolees and parolees expect more
privacy than prisoners.206 The Court ultimately concluded that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a
suspicionless search of a parolee.207
Most recently, in State v. Gonzalez,208 a supervised probationer
challenged the search of his cellphone.209 The North Dakota Supreme
Court held that under the totality of circumstances, when a warrantless
search is authorized by a condition of probation and is supported by
reasonable suspicion, it is valid and reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.210
Ballard was a case of first impression in North Dakota. Despite
rigorous examination of previous case law regarding suspicionless searches
of parolees and probationers, the North Dakota Supreme Court never had

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id.
331 N.W.2d 14 (N.D. 1983).
Ballard, ¶ 14, 874 N.W.2d at 65.
534 U.S. 112 (2001).
Ballard, ¶ 22, 874 N.W.2d at 67-68.
2002 ND 121, 647 N.W.2d 688.
Ballard, ¶ 23, 874 N.W.2d at 68.
547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006).
Ballard, ¶ 26, 874 N.W.2d at 69.
Id. ¶ 33, 874 N.W.2d at 70.
2015 ND 106, ¶ 1, 862 N.W.2d 535, 538.
Ballard, ¶ 27, 874 N.W.2d at 69.
Id.
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the opportunity to take into account state cases which analyzed the
constitutionality of a suspicionless search agreed upon as a term of
probation for an unsupervised probationer as the sole basis for a search
producing evidence of criminal conduct. While acknowledging Ballard’s
status as an unsupervised probationer is a form of criminal sanction211
which reasonably denies him some degree of liberty, the North Dakota
Supreme Court recognized that penalties imposed on an unsupervised
probationer, the least egregious category of American criminals, should
restrict the smallest degree of such individual’s liberties compared with
more egregious classes of criminals.212 The Court noted the stark contrast
of the relatively light conditions of probation bestowed upon Ballard
compared to the loss of liberty, required drug testing, and limited travel
restraints placed upon the parolee in Samson and the supervised probationer
in Knights.213 As such, the North Dakota Supreme Court held the degree of
freedom imposed by Ballard’s parole conditions outweighed the
governmental interest in his restriction in this case, and found the
suspicionless search of his home unconstitutionally unreasonable.214 The
North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order to deny
Ballard’s motion to suppress evidence and remanded to allow Ballard to
withdraw his guilty plea.215
Justice McEvers concurred with the majority, and wrote separately,
stating the governmental interest in restricting a criminal on supervised
probation is less than that of an unsupervised probationer, and that
distinction should weigh into the reasonableness of a suspicionless
search.216 Justice McEvers further noted that when the search of Ballard’s
person and vehicle did not yield contraband, the deputy’s suspicion should
have dissipated and he should not have searched Ballard’s home, making
the search constitutionally unreasonable.217
Justice Sandstrom dissented, and argued the majority erroneously
concluded that the United States Constitution requires reasonable suspicion
for probation searches.218 He further stated that even if reasonable
suspicion was the proper standard, it was a question of law that should have

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. ¶ 35, 874 N.W.2d at 70-71.
Id. ¶¶ 36-37.
See id. ¶¶ 38-40, 874 N.W.2d at 71-72.
Id. ¶ 41, 874 N.W.2d at 72.
Ballard, ¶ 42, 874 N.W.2d at 72.
Id. ¶¶ 43-44 (McEvers, J., concurring).
Id. ¶ 47, 874 N.W.2d at 73.
Id. ¶¶ 49-50 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
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been reviewed de novo.219 Justice Sandstrom would have affirmed the
district court’s decision based upon the reasonable suspicion he believed
was created by Ballard’s drug-related criminal history and his travel with
another individual on probation for drug-related convictions.220
Justice Sandstrom noted the North Dakota Supreme Court has
previously held that a search “. . . did not violate the Fourth Amendment
because ‘reasonable suspicion’ is not required for a probationary search as
long as the search is reasonable.”221 He acknowledged the United States
Supreme Court has left open the question of whether the Fourth
Amendment authorizes searching an individual simply because she is on
probation, but stated the holding in Samson authorized such a search on a
parolee solely for her condition of being on parole.222 He also stated the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has been reluctant to decide whether the
constitutionality of a warrantless probationary search requires
individualized suspicion.223 Justice Sandstrom also noted the significant
variance among the states regarding the constitutional parameters of
suspicionless probationary searches.224 Justice Sandstrom believes the
North Dakota Supreme Court has set rather concrete limits on an issue not
yet substantially decided by higher courts’ jurisprudence by explicitly
holding that a suspicionless, warrantless search of an unsupervised
probationer is prima facie unconstitutional.225
Justice Sandstrom, agreed with the majority that the constitutional
bounds of warrantless searches on probationers are predicated on weighing
the probationer’s freedom of privacy with the state’s interests to reduce
recidivism and protect its citizens.226 He noted, however, that the purpose
of suspicionless searches is to deter probationers from the commission of
crime and to aid them in rehabilitation.227 Justice Sandstrom argued that the
benefits of deterrence and rehabilitation are diminished in the majority’s
holding, because probationers will know they cannot be searched without
reasonable suspicion and will be able to conceal their crimes, especially
drug-related crimes, in the privacy of their homes or at times they know

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. ¶ 51, 874 N.W.2d at 73-74.
Id. at 74.
State v. Smith, 1999 ND 9, ¶ 9, 589 N.W.2d 546.
Ballard, ¶ 58, 874 N.W.2d at 75.
Id. ¶ 61, 874 N.W.2d at 77.
Id. ¶ 60, 874 N.W.2d at 76.
See id. ¶¶ 54-61, 874 N.W.2d at 74-78.
Id. ¶ 62, 874 N.W.2d at 78.
Id. ¶ 64, 874 N.W.2d at 79.
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will be undisturbed by probation or law enforcement officers.228 Since
Ballard was at a higher risk of recidivism, he argued that “. . . it is
reasonable to conclude the exercise of the search clause contributed to the
rehabilitation process regardless of whether Ballard’s probation was
deemed supervised or unsupervised.”229
Continuing his analysis of the circumstances surrounding Ballard,
Justice Sandstrom noted there was nothing in the record to indicate the
search was conducted for an improper amount of time or that any property
was damaged during the search.230 Further, the search immediately
followed the deputy stopping Ballard’s vehicle, was confined to the
bedroom Ballard identified as his own, and was not conducted in a
harassing manner.231 Justice Sandstrom concluded that the search in
Ballard was reasonable and properly conducted.232 He viewed the degree
of personal liberty Ballard lost due to his probationary status more severely
than the majority.
Chief Justice VandeWalle wrote a brief dissent agreeing with the
majority of Justice Sandstrom’s opinion.233 The Chief Justice also noted
that the conditions of Ballard’s probation, as written, were vague and
should not be written as such in future district court sentences.234

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Ballard, ¶ 64, 874 N.W.2d at 79.
Id. ¶ 69, 874 N.W.2d at 81.
Id. ¶ 70.
Id.
Id. ¶ 75, 874 N.W.2d at 83.
Id. ¶¶ 80-81, 874 N.W.2d at 84-85 (Vande Walle, C. J., dissenting).
Ballard, ¶ 81, N.W.2d at 84.
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CRIMINAL LAW – STATUTES – PROPER ADVISORY
State v. O’Connor
In State v. O’Connor,235 the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the
district court’s suppression order because, after arresting Blaise O’Connor
(“O’Connor”) for driving under the influence of alcohol, the law
enforcement officer failed to inform him of the complete implied consent
advisory before administering the Intoxilyzer test.236
On May 24, 2015, a highway patrol officer stopped O’Connor for a
defective taillight, 237 and suspected him of driving under the influence due
to his slurred speech and bloodshot and watery eyes.238 O’Connor admitted
to consuming alcohol.239 The officer requested O’Connor to perform field
sobriety tests, allegedly recited a complete implied consent advisory, and
asked O’Connor if he would submit to an onsite screening test.240
The State claimed the officer read the complete implied consent
advisory, which O’Connor contested.241 The implied consent advisory
articulated in North Dakota Century Code § 39-20-14(3) related to
screening tests and included the warning that “refusal to take the screening
test is a crime.”242 Ultimately, O’Connor surrendered to the onsite
screening test, which showed a blood alcohol level over the presumptive
limit.243
The officer arrested O’Connor and drove him to the Cass County
jail,244 where the officer asked if O’Connor remembered the implied
consent advisory previously read to him.245 O’Connor answered, “yeah, I
think so.”246 It was uncontested that the officer provided an incomplete
implied consent advisory to O’Connor before he submitted to the
Intoxilyzer test.247 Specifically, the officer failed to advise O’Connor that
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2016 ND 72, 877 N.W.2d 312.
Id. ¶ 1, 877 N.W.2d at 313.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
O’Connor, ¶ 2, 877 N.W.2d at 313.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
O’Connor, ¶ 3, 877 N.W.2d at 313.
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“refusal to take a chemical test ‘is a crime punishable in the same manner as
driving under the influence.’”248
Because the officer failed to provide a complete implied consent
advisory after O’Connor was arrested and before he submitted to a chemical
test, O’Connor moved to suppress the result of the Intoxilyzer test.249 The
district court granted O’Connor’s motion to suppress, determining, “A plain
language reading of the statutes does not allow the implied consent advisory
for screening tests under § 39-20-14 to be a substitute for the implied
consent advisory for chemical tests under § 39-20-01.”250 The court found
that the officer failed to give O’Connor a complete and proper advisory
after arrest and before submission to the chemical test.251 Therefore, the
court decided that “pursuant to § 39-20-01(3)(b), [O’Connor’s] Intoxilyzer
chemical test [was] not admissible and must be excluded from the[]
proceedings.”252
The State argued that the district court erred in granting O’Connor’s
motion to suppress.253 The North Dakota Supreme Court articulated its
well established254 standard of review for motions to suppress evidence.255
The implied consent requirements for the motor vehicle drivers in general
are set forth in N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-01.256 Over one month before
O’Connor’s arrest, on April 15, 2015, the North Dakota Legislature passed
an emergency amendment to N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-01(3) to add
subdivision b.257 The district court reasoned, using a plain meaning

248. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01(3)(a) (2016)).
249. Id. ¶ 4.
250. Id. at 313-14.
251. Id. at 314.
252. Id.
253. O’Connor, ¶ 5, 877 N.W.2d at 314.
254. State v. Boehm, 2014 ND 154, ¶ 8, 849 N.W.2d 239, 244.
255. O’Connor, ¶ 6, 877 N.W.2d at 314 (citing State v. Whitman, 2013 ND 183, ¶ 20, 838
N.W.2d 401, 406-07), stating:
A trial court’s findings of fact in preliminary proceedings of a criminal case will not
be reversed if, after the conflicts in testimony are resolved in favor of affirmance, there
is a sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the trial court’s
findings, and the decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. We
do not conduct a de novo review. We evaluate the evidence presented to see, based on
the standard of review, if it supports the findings of fact.
256. Id. ¶ 7 (citing State v. Bauer, 2015 ND 132, ¶ 7, 863 N.W.2d 534, 536).
257. Id.; see 2015 N.D. SESS. LAWS CH. 268 § 9; currently, and at the time of O’Connor’s
arrest, N.D. CENT. CODE. § 39-20-01(3) (2016) provides:
The law enforcement officer shall inform the individual charged that North Dakota
law requires the individual to take the test to determine whether the individual is under
the influence of alcohol or drugs; that refusal to take the test directed by the law
enforcement officer is a crime punishable in the same manner as driving under the
influence; and that refusal of the individual to submit to the test directed by the law
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analysis,258 that since O’Connor was the “individual charged” and it was
uncontested the officer failed to provide a complete implied consent
advisory259 before administering the Intoxilyzer chemical test, the results of
said test were inadmissible in O’Connor’s driving under the influence
proceeding.260
The State presented two arguments intended to circumvent the plain
language of the statute.261 First, the State argued under State v. Salter,262
that the district court erred when it failed to substitute the officer’s onsite
screening advisory for an incomplete advisory given after O’Connor’s
arrest and before administration of the chemical test.263 The Supreme Court
disagreed, asserting that to the extent the State’s rationale under Salter
applied, “it ha[d] been abrogated by the plain language of the 2015
amendment to N.D.C.C. § 39-20-01(3).”264
Second, the State argued that voluntary consent was an independent
ground for admission of O’Connor’s chemical test, and relied on three
previous North Dakota Supreme Court cases.265 These cases held that “the
[N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-01 provisions] do not apply if a person
voluntarily submits to a chemical test under Fourth Amendment consent
principles.”266 The Supreme Court also disagreed with this argument, for
the same reason¾“the voluntary consent holdings in Fossum, Hoffner[,]
and Abrahamson have been abrogated by the plain language of the amended
statute as well.”267

enforcement officer may result in a revocation for a minimum of one hundred eighty
days and up to three years of the individual’s driving privileges.
A test administered under this section is not admissible in any criminal or
administrative proceeding to determine a violation of section 39-08-01 or this chapter
if the law enforcement officer fails to inform the individual charged as required under
subdivision a.
258. O’Connor, ¶ 8, 877 N.W.2d at 314-15 (citing State v. Rufus, 2015 ¶ 15, 868 N.W.2d
534, 540) (“[W]ords of a statute are given their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood
meaning unless a contrary intention plainly appears”).
259. Id. Specifically, the officer failed to advise O’Connor before administering the test that
refusal to submit to the chemical test is a crime that could result in the same punishment as driving
under the influence.
260. Id.
261. Id. ¶ 9, 877 N.W.2d at 315.
262. 2008 ND 230, 758 N.W.2d 702.
263. O’Connor, ¶¶ 9-11, 877 N.W.2d at 315-16.
264. Id. ¶ 11, 877 N.W.2d at 315.
265. Id. ¶ 12, 877 N.W.2d at 316. The State cited the following three cases: Fossum v. N.D.
Dept. of Transp., 2014 ND 47, 843 N.W.2d 282; City of Bismarck v. Hoffner, 379 N.W.2d 282
(N.D. 1985); and State v. Abrahamson, 328 N.W.2d 213 (N.D. 1982).
266. O’Connor, ¶ 12, 877 N.W.2d at 316 (emphasis added).
267. Id.
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Finally, the Court dispelled the parties’ contentions regarding the
impact of the legislative history of 2015 for § 30-20-01(3)(b) reasoning that
“the Legislature has clearly and unambiguously spoken . . . [it] has directed
that a specific warning be provided to an arrested defendant before the
results of a chemical test can be admitted in a criminal or administrative
proceeding.”268 The Court reiterated further by stating that it offered
“special deference to the Legislature” and that “adopting the State’s
arguments here would eviscerate the 2015 amendment to [ N.D. Cent.
Code] § 39-20-01(3).”269
After rejecting both of the State’s arguments and explaining its
deference to the Legislature, the Supreme Court found that the officer did
not provide O’Connor a complete chemical test implied consent advisory
after his arrest and before submission to the Intoxilyzer test.270 Therefore,
finding it did not err, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district
court’s suppression order.271
Chief Justice VandeWalle concurred specially, agreeing that the
Legislature had established a bright line and the statutes left no room for the
Court to engage in a legislative intent determination or whether a person
was disadvantaged by an incorrect or incomplete advisory.272

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id. ¶ 12, 877 N.W.2d at 316-17.
Id. ¶¶ 13-14.
Id. ¶¶ 14-17, 877 N.W.2d at 317.
Id.
O’Connor, ¶¶ 18-19 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring).
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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW – STATUTORY RIGHTS OF ACTION –
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Vogel v. Marathon Oil Co.
In Vogel v. Marathon Oil Co.,273 the North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court’s judgment dismissing without prejudice the mineral
interest owner’s action against the oil company for damages for failure to
pay royalties on flared gas.274 Vogel, the mineral interest owner, alleged
Marathon Oil Company flared gas produced from the well and that some of
the gas flared was in violation of North Dakota Century Code § 38–08–
06.4.275
Section 38-08-06.4 restricted the flaring of gas produced with crude oil
from an oil well.276 The statute provided for royalty payments to the
mineral owners if an oil well was operated in violation of the specified
restrictions.277 It also authorized the industrial commission to enforce the
section and to determine the amount of royalty payments to be paid.278
Vogel argued that her claims under § 38-08-06.4 should not have been
dismissed because there was an implied private right of action for damages
under the statute.279 The Court disagreed.280 In concluding that there was
not an implied private right of action for damages under the statute, the
Court noted three factors to be used in determining whether a private right
of action should be implied under a statute:
(1) [W]hether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose special
benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether there is an indication
of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such
remedy or to deny one; and (3) whether it is consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a
remedy for the plaintiff.281
As to the first factor, the Court concluded that Vogel “appear[ed] to be
a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted.”282 But the

273. 2016 ND 104, 879 N.W.2d 471.
274. Id. ¶ 1, 879 N.W.2d at 474.
275. Id. ¶ 3, 879 N.W.2d at 474-75.
276. Id. ¶ 10, 879 N.W.2d at 476 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-06.4 (2016)).
277. Id.
278. Vogel, ¶ 10, 879 N.W.2d at 476.
279. Id. ¶ 9.
280. Id. ¶ 21, 879 N.W.2d at 479.
281. Id. ¶ 12, 879 N.W.2d at 476 (citing Empower the Taxpayer v. Fong, 2012 ND 119, 817
N.W.2d 381).
282. Id. ¶ 13, 879 N.W.2d at 477.
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“ultimate issue,” according to the Court, was the second factor¾ whether
the legislature intended, explicitly or implicitly, to create a remedy.283 The
statute’s plain language did not indicate any legislative intent to provide a
private right of action,284 but the comprehensive regulatory scheme within
the statute, the Court said, was strongly indicative that the legislature did
not intent to provide any other remedies.285 Because Vogel failed to
establish that the legislature intended to create a private right of action for
damages, the Court decided that it “need not address the third factor.”286
Thus, the Court concluded, there was not an implied private right of action
for damages under § 38-08-06.4.287
Vogel also argued that the Environmental Law Enforcement Act
(“ELEA”) of 1975¾N.D. Cent. Code § 32-40-02¾provided her with a
private right of action to enforce § 38-08-06.4, and, as such, the district
court had erred in dismissing her claim.288
The ELEA provides a private right of action for persons aggrieved by
alleged violations of state environmental statutes:
[A]ny person . . . aggrieved by the violation of any environmental
statute, rule, or regulation of this state may bring an action in the
appropriate district court, either to enforce such statute, rule, or
regulation, or to recover any damages that have occurred as a
result of the violation, or for both such enforcement and damages.
Such action may be brought against any person, state agency, or
county, city, township, or other political subdivision allegedly
engaged in such violation.289
An environmental statute is “any statute . . . for the protection of the
air, water, and other natural resources, including land, minerals, and
wildlife, from pollution, impairment, or destruction.”290 Vogel argued that
§ 38-08-06.4 was an environmental statute as defined by the ELEA.291 The
Court agreed given that oil and gas are generally classified as minerals.292
But the Court continued:

283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Id. ¶ 12.
Vogel, ¶ 14, 879 N.W.2d at 477.
Id. ¶¶ 14, 17.
Id. ¶ 21, 879 N.W.2d at 479.
Id.
Id. ¶ 22, 879 N.W.2d at 480.
Id. ¶ 23 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 32–40–06 (2016)).
Vogel, ¶ 24, 879 N.W.2d at 480 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 32–40–03(2) (2016)).
Id.
Id.
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Although the ELEA may provide a private right of action for a
violation of 38–08–06.4, any remedies the ELEA provides are
cumulative and do not replace statutory or common law
remedies. . . . If a party is allowed to bring a judicial action for a
violation of 38–08–06.4 before they pursue the administrative
remedies provided by the statute, the ELEA will replace the
statutory remedy.293
Because the statute provided an administrative remedy for the royalty
owner to pursue in the case of a violation, the Court stated “that remedy
must be pursued before pursuing a private action as an ‘aggrieved person’
under the ELEA.”294 The ELEA was available as a remedy only if the
Industrial Commission failed or refused to act.295 The Court also held that
the remedy provided in § 38-08-06.4 replaced common law claims for
royalties on flared gas.296
Chief Justice VandeWalle wrote a concurring opinion.297 He agreed
with the majority’s “analysis of whether or not a statute requires exhaustion
of administrative remedies and whether or not it creates a private cause of
action,”298 but expressed concern that the decision will be cited as the basis
for the position that § 38–08–06.4 is the exclusive remedy for lessors.299
Justice Kapsner dissented.300
She noted that the majority
acknowledged that § 32-40-06 both authorizes a person aggrieved by the
violation of an environmental statute to bring an action in district court, and
that § 38-08-06.4 is an environmental statute as defined by the ELEA.301
“However,” she wrote, “the majority’s holding eviscerates the ELEA by
requiring an aggrieved person to first exhaust administrative remedies
before bringing an action under the ELEA.”302 Justice Kapsner viewed this
requirement as contrary to the plain language of the statute, which stated
that the remedies provided by the chapter are to be cumulative and shall not
replace statutory or common law remedies.303 A cumulative remedy, she
noted, is “[a] remedy available to a party in addition to another remedy that

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id. ¶ 25, 879 N.W.2d at 481.
Id. ¶ 28, 879 N.W.2d at 481-82 (emphasis added).
Id.
Vogel, ¶ 34, 879 N.W.2d at 483.
Id. ¶ 44, 879 N.W.2d at 485.
Id. ¶ 45.
Id. ¶ 50, 879 N.W.2d at 486.
Id. ¶ 51.
Id. ¶ 53.
Vogel, ¶ 53, 879 N.W.2d at 486.
Id.
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still remains in force.”304 Justice Kapsner also noted that the Court has held
that cumulative remedies “are not identical and neither the pursuit of one of
the available remedies nor the failure to pursue one will bar an action on
the other.”305

304. Id. ¶ 65, 879 N.W.2d at 489 (emphasis added).
305. Id. at 489-90.
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FAMILY LAW – DIVORCE – EARNING CAPACITY
Stock v. Stock
In Stock v. Stock,306 the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the
district court’s judgment awarding the wife permanent spousal support of
$3,000 per month until the husband’s child support obligation ended, at
which time, the award would increase to $5,500 per month.307
Robert Stock (“Robert”), the husband, appealed the district court’s
judgment, arguing that the district court’s award of permanent support, and
the amount of support awarded, were clearly erroneous.308
Spousal support awards are findings of fact, which are not to be set
aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous.309 The Court noted the clearly
erroneous standard it follows:
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an
erroneous view of the law, if there is no evidence to support it, or
if, after a review of the entire record, [the Supreme Court is] left
with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.310
Though the Court expressed a preference for rehabilitative support over
permanent support, it noted that when there is a substantial disparity
between the spouses’ incomes, it may be appropriate to award indefinite
permanent support to “maintain the disadvantaged spouse.”311 The Court
stated that this may be true even where a spouse is capable of
rehabilitation.312 Thus, the Court concluded that Robert’s argument was
misplaced where he claimed that the permanent support award was clearly
erroneous, because Tiffany Stock (“Tiffany”) was young, healthy, and
capable of rehabilitation.313 In determining whether spousal support is
appropriate, courts must look to the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the parties.314 Although a spouse’s youth, health, and
capability for rehabilitation favor rehabilitative support, the Court noted
that such factors do not preclude a permanent support award.315 The Court

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

2016 ND 1, 873 N.W.2d 38.
Id. ¶ 1, 873 N.W.2d at 41.
Id. ¶ 8, 873 N.W.2d at 42.
Id. at 42-43.
Id. (citing Krueger v. Krueger, 2008 ND 90, ¶ 7, 748 N.W.2d 671).
Id. ¶ 10, 873 N.W.2d at 43 (citing Fox v. Fox, 1999 ND 68, 592 N.W.2d 541).
Stock, ¶ 10, 873 N.W.2d at 43 (citing Riehl v. Riehl, 1999 ND 107, ¶ 18, 595 N.W.2d

10).
313. Id. ¶ 11.
314. Id.
315. Id.
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reasoned that Tiffany had foregone employment prospects throughout the
marriage to advance Robert’s legal career by moving multiple times and
caring for their children, resulting in a disparity of earning capacity.316
The Court also concluded that the amount of support awarded by the
district court was not clearly erroneous.317 In determining an appropriate
support award, a court considers both the financial needs of the spouse
seeking support and the ability of the other spouse to provide for such
needs.318 “An award amount is clearly erroneous where the amount unduly
burdens the payor spouse by leaving the spouse in a nearly impossible
financial position.”319 The Court was unpersuaded by Robert’s argument
that he is unable to pay the support.320
The Court reasoned that although the husband’s child support and
spousal support obligations exceeded his salaried pre-tax base pay, he could
rely on his year-end bonus to cover the difference between his expenses and
base pay.321 Further, if his legal practice were to suffer making it difficult to
pay the amount, he could ask a court to modify the support.322 Therefore,
the Court concluded that Robert was able to pay the spousal support.
Justice Sandstrom dissented, stating that under the clearly erroneous
standard he had “a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made
here”; he urged that the “spousal support lottery . . . be addressed
structurally by timely legislation.”323 He noted that the result in the case –
Robert and Tiffany “yoked together,” with Robert given the duty to pay
spousal support for three times the length of the marriage, a payout of more
than $2.5 million324 – could have been different had the parties had a
different judge, or the same judge on a different day.325 He advocated a
prompt reform of spousal support law in North Dakota.326

316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id. ¶¶ 12-13, 873 N.W.2d at 43-44.
Id. ¶19, 873 N.W.2d at 46.
Stock, ¶ 18, 873 N.W.2d at 45.
Id.
Id. ¶ 19, 873 N.W.2d at 46.
Id. at 43.
Id.
Id. ¶ 43, 873 N.W.2d at 50 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
Stock, ¶ 35, 873 N.W.2d at 49.
Id. ¶ 37.
Id. ¶ 43, 873 N.W.2d at 50.
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INSURANCE LAW – POLICY PROVISION DEFINITIONS
Nodak Mutual Insurance Company v. Koller
In Nodak Mutual Insurance Company v. Koller,327 the North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment.328 The Court found
that because Chase Koller (“Koller”) was not a resident of Todd Anderson’s
household at the time of the accident, only the lower “step-down” policy
limits of an automobile insurance policy were available in defense of a
wrongful death lawsuit that resulted from a fatal accident involving
Koller.329
When Koller allegedly lost control of an all-terrain vehicle, he and his
girlfriend, Stephanie Nelson, were killed.330 The registered owner of the
vehicle was Becky Anderson, Koller’s mother.331 Nodak Mutual Insurance
Company (“Nodak”) issued the policy that covered the vehicle under the
named insured, Todd Anderson, Koller’s stepfather.332 The policy provided
up to $100,000 per incident for a “family member” of the proposed
insured.333 The policy defined a “family member” as “a person related to
you by blood, marriage or adoption, including a ward or foster child, who is
a resident of your household.”334 The “step-down” provision reduced the
policy limits to $25,000 if the vehicle was driven by an insured who was
not a “family member” of the named insured.335
Koller moved out of the Anderson’s household in 2003, was not listed
as a dependent on their tax returns since 2002, and was dropped as an
authorized driver on Todd Anderson’s Nodak automobile insurance policy
in 2005.336 In 2006, Koller moved to Grand Forks, North Dakota, where he
intermittently lived and maintained a residence until the date of his death.337
At the time of his death, Koller temporarily lived with his mother and
stepfather, Becky and Todd Anderson at their home and worked in Griggs
County.338 According to testimony, Koller was in a serious relationship

327.
328.
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332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
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2016 ND 43, 876 N.W.2d 451.
Id. ¶ 1, 876 N.W.2d at 452.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2
Id.
Id.
Koller, ¶ 2, 876 N.W.2d at 452.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. at 453.
Id. ¶ 5.
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with Stephanie Nelson and intended to move to Devils Lake to live with her
at the end of the summer of 2011.339
Following the fatal accident, Becky Anderson, represented by an
attorney hired by Nodak, prepared probate documents in Griggs County,
because Koller was living and working in this county at the time of his
death.340 The district court determined Griggs County was the proper venue
for probate.341
Seeking a declaration for liability of only the reduced step-down policy
limits because Koller was not a resident of Todd Anderson’s household,
and, therefore not a family member of the insured, Nodak sued Becky
Anderson in her capacity as Personal Representative to the Estate of Chase
Koller, and Chris Kemp (“Kemp”), as guardian of C.K., and the heirs of
Stephanie Nelson.342
Kemp filed an answer, cross-claim, and a third-party complaint
asserting wrongful death against Becky Anderson in her capacity as the
Personal Representative of Koller’s Estate.343 Kemp, claiming the family
car doctrine, also asserted negligent entrustment against Todd and Becky
Anderson individually.344 Pursuant to North Dakota Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 21, the district court severed the wrongful death action from
Nodak’s declaratory action.345
When Kemp moved for summary judgment in the declaratory action,
the district court granted his motion, determining Koller was a resident of
the Andersons’ household.346 However, the district court vacated its order
in Kemp’s favor and scheduled a bench trial to assess the issue of whether
Koller was a resident of Todd Anderson’s household by applying the
factors articulated in Nodak Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bahr-Renner.347
In Bahr-Renner, the North Dakota Supreme Court articulated the
following factors to determine whether an individual is a resident of a
named insured’s household: (1) the intent of the parties; (2) the formality of
the relationship; (3) permanence or transient nature; and (4) the age and
self-sufficiency of the party in question.348 District courts are not required

339. Koller, ¶ 5, 876 N.W.2d at 453.
340. Id. ¶ 6.
341. Id.
342. Id. ¶ 7.
343. Id.
344. Id.; see Close v. Ebertz, 1998 ND 167, 583 N.W.2d 794.
345. Koller, ¶ 7, 876 N.W.2d at 453.
346. Id.
347. Id. ¶ 8, 876 N.W.2d at 454.
348. Nodak Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bahr-Renner, 2014 ND 39, 842 N.W.2d 912 (2014); Koller, ¶
11, 876 N.W.2d at 454-55.
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to make a determination under each of these nonexclusive factors, rather
they are to consider the totality of the circumstances on a case-by-case
basis.349 After considering the Bahr-Renner factors, the district court
reversed its previous judgment, ruled in favor of Nodak, and found that
Koller was not a resident of Todd Anderson’s household.350 Unless the
district court’s decision that Koller was not a resident of Todd Anderson’s
household is clearly erroneous, the North Dakota Supreme Court must
affirm its decision.351
Kemp contested the district court’s findings regarding each of the
factors, even when the court weighed a factor in his favor.352 The North
Dakota Supreme Court analyzed Kemp’s arguments by factor, yet affirmed
each of the district court’s findings.353
First, Kemp unsuccessfully argued that the district court failed to
consider all relevant evidence of intent regarding the “intent of the
parties.”354 Specifically, the court did not recognize that because Koller
expressed plans to abandon his Grand Forks apartment, he was, therefore, a
resident of the Todd Anderson household.355
The district court determined that the Andersons and Koller were not a
family living together as defined in the policy for several reasons, including
the testimony of Todd and Becky Anderson stating their belief that Koller’s
stay was temporary, while he worked at a nearby resort for the summer.356
According to the record, after the summer, Koller planned to move to
Devils Lake with serious girlfriend, Stephanie Nelson.357 Job Service
records show Nelson searched, presumably on behalf of Koller, for
construction jobs in Devils Lake, where the two planned to live together
temporarily with Nelson’s mother.358
The court also considered Becky Anderson’s testimony stating that
Koller left his furnishings and numerous personal effects in Grand Forks
and did not have a key to the Andersons’ house.359 The North Dakota

349. Koller, ¶ 12, 876 N.W.2d at 455.
350. Id. ¶ 13.
351. Id. (citing N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a)(6): “Findings of fact . . . whether based on oral or other
evidence must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due
regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility”).
352. Id. ¶¶ 14-33, 876 N.W.2d. at 455-59.
353. Id.
354. Id. ¶ 14, 876 N.W.2d at 455.
355. Koller, ¶ 14, 876 N.W.2d at 455.
356. Id. ¶ 15.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id. ¶ 17, 876 N.W.2d at 456.
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Supreme Court determined that “any intent by Koller to abandon the Grand
Forks residence in favor of a possible move to Devils Lake was a future
event not associated with making the Anderson home his residence” so the
district court’s intent of the parties’ finding was not clearly erroneous.360
Next, Kemp challenged the district court’s decision regarding the
“formality of the relationship” factor even though it found Becky
Anderson’s relationship with Koller “could not be more formal, motherson.”361 Specifically, Kemp argued the court failed to consider Koller’s
relationship with Todd Anderson and the Andersons’ relationship with
A.K., their grandchild.362 However, the formality of the relationship
analysis is between the “person in question” and the “other members of the
named insured’s household.”363 Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme
Court invalidated Kemp’s argument, reasoning that even if the district court
failed to mention these ancillary relationships, the omission was
insignificant because the district court found in Kemp’s favor.364
Kemp also disagreed with the district court’s conclusion regarding the
“permanence or transient nature” factor, saying the court gave it undue
weight by failing to make a determination regarding “the existence of
another place of lodging” factor.365 Kemp claimed the totality of the
circumstances supports a conclusion that, at the time of his death, Koller
was a resident of Todd Anderson’s household.366
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s finding
that Koller’s stay in the Anderson’s home was of a “transient” nature and
“solely the result of Koller’s loss of employment in Grand Forks.”367 The
Court again cited several pertinent factors in verifying the district court’s
assessment, including the probate venue affidavit signed by Becky
Anderson, Koller’s serious relationship with Stephanie Nelson and planned
move to Devils Lake to be with her, the fact that Koller was fully
emancipated and not financially reliant upon his mother and stepfather, and
the June 12, 2005, removal of Koller as a driver on Todd Anderson’s
insurance policy.368
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Koller, ¶ 17, 876 N.W.2d at 456.
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When it failed to make a determination regarding the “existence of
another place of lodging” factor, Kemp argued that the district court
erred.369 Furthermore, Kemp argued that the totality of the circumstances
surrounding this factor also supports a conclusion that Koller was a resident
of the Todd Anderson household.370 The Supreme Court acknowledged
that while the district court did not make an express determination
regarding another place of lodging, its decision was not clearly erroneous
because it made findings relevant to the factor.371 These relevant findings
again include Becky Anderson’s signed probate venue affidavit, and the
facts that Koller did not take any furniture to the Anderson household, that
Koller still continued to receive mail at his Grand Forks residence, and that
Koller’s North Dakota driver’s license, death certificate, and obituaries
listed his address as his Grand Forks residence.372
Kemp argued the district court erred in its decision regarding the “age
and self-sufficiency” factor.373 The North Dakota Supreme Court again
verified that the district court’s finding that Koller was self-sufficient was
not clearly erroneous.374 The Supreme Court found ample evidence in the
record that supported the district court’s finding, including the fact that
Koller moved out of the Anderson home when he was eighteen, finished his
education, joined the military, moved to Grand Forks, and had custody of
his child.375 The Court explained that “[w]hile Koller clearly benefitted by
having a rent-free place to stay for himself and his child, it does not
necessarily equate to a lack of self-sufficiency.”376
Finally, Kemp argued the district court erred when it failed to establish
Koller’s residency, as a matter of law, in Griggs County, where his estate
was probated.377 The North Dakota Supreme Court reiterated that
“technical notions of legal residence and domicile are not controlling.”378
The Court continued by explaining that even if the district court did factor
the probate venue into its assessment, this fact is not determinative, as a
matter of law.379 Therefore, the district court did not err by failing to

369. Id. ¶ 27, 876 N.W.2d at 458.
370. Id.
371. Id. ¶¶ 27-30.
372. Koller, ¶¶ 27-30, 876 N.W.2d at 458.
373. Id. ¶ 31, 876 N.W.2d at 459.
374. Id. ¶¶ 31-33.
375. Id. ¶ 32.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Koller, ¶ 34, 876 N.W.2d at 459 (citing Nodak Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bahr-Renner, 2014
ND 39, ¶ 9, 842 N.W.2d 912 (2014)).
379. Id. ¶¶ 34-35.
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conclude that Koller was not an Anderson household resident, simply
because his estate was probated in Griggs County.380
The North Dakota Supreme Court articulated that, while it may not
have drawn the same conclusions under de novo review, the clearly
erroneous standard applicable in this case precluded the Court from
reweighing evidence.381 Having reviewed the entire record and analyzing
the application of the Bahr-Renner factors, the North Dakota Supreme
Court concluded that the district court’s finding that Koller was not a
resident of Todd Anderson’s household for purposes of the policy were not
clearly erroneous.382 The North Dakota Supreme Court also concluded that
the district court did not err when ruling that the lower “step-down”
provision applied due to the finding that Koller was not a resident of Todd
Anderson’s household.383
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